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ABSTRACT 
This article reviews the current state of research on education externalities. It finds that 
much of the confusion regarding their magnitude results from conceptual 
misunderstandings about their nature. The concepts of 'education', 'teaching', and 
'knowledge' need to be distinguished for a better understanding. Whereas pure teaching 
yields externalities on the primary and secondary level, only the generation of knowledge 
may produce the spillovers which are typically linked to the tertiary level. The 
accumulation of education itself does not have such an effect. Education is argued to be a 
private good with well defined property rights. Individuals may exploit those and provide 
the production sector with the efficient amount of human capital. Following this rationale, 
it is demonstrated that empirical studies, contrasting estimates of private and social 
returns to education, are unsuitable to substantiate the existence of externalities. As a 
consequence, subsidies to tertiary programs are called into question. 
JEL Classification:  D62, H23, H52, I22, I28, O11, O47 
Keywords:  Public education finance; Education expenditures; Human capital 
externalities; Property rights; Endogenous economic growth; Private and 
social return to education 
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1. Introduction 
The goal of research on education externalities has been stated by Moretti (2003) to 
be twofold. "First it should credibly assess the magnitude of spillovers. […] A second 
goal should be to empirically investigate the mechanisms that give rise to externalities." 
(p.3). It is not last owed to the failure of research to achieve these goals that leads 
international governments to follow quite different strategies when it comes to the public 
contribution to education finance.1 Even though economists have spent some effort in 
quantifying externalities (Heckman and Klenow, 1997; Krueger and Lindahl, 2001; 
Gundlach and Woessmann, 2004; Rauch, 1993; Rudd, 2000; Acemoglu and Angrist, 
2000; Moretti, 2004; Muravyev, 2006; Ciccone and Peri, 2006), as well as private and 
social returns to education (see Harmon, Oosterbeek and Walker, 2003; Sianesi and van 
Reenen, 2003), a mutual consent has not yet been achieved. Consequently, there is no 
accepted guiding principle pertaining to the optimal scope of public education subsidies. 
This is less evident in the case of primary and secondary expenditures, but much more 
visible when it comes to tertiary spending. Figure 1 depicts international public 
expenditures on primary and secondary, respectively tertiary teaching institutions as a 
share of GDP. The variation in the right picture is obviously higher. The coefficient of 
variance is 18.2 in the case of primary and secondary spending, and 28.5 for tertiary 
spending. Figure 2 shows public spending as a share of total spending on educational 
institutions across OECD countries. The respective coefficients of variation are 6.1 for 
primary and secondary spending and 25.2 for tertiary spending. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
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In order to contribute to more unanimity in this matter, it appears vital to first of all 
suspend the ongoing quantification efforts for a moment, back-pedal and sum up what has 
been achieved so far. This is necessary to make sure that everyone is on the same page 
before continuing research. Conversations with fellow researchers have convinced me that 
quite a few different perceptions are out there regarding the nature and existence of 
education externalities. Not least, my own persistent misunderstandings encouraged me to 
make an attempt of bringing more light to the fogginess of the externality debate. 
Consequently, this essay critically evaluates the current state of research on 
education externalities since their mention by Gary Becker (1964). No other contribution 
could be found, which narrows down previous work in a comparably concise manner and 
directs attention to the relevant questions, such as: Have we managed to come closer to 
the goal of our research? Do we actually understand the mechanisms that give rise to 
externalities? And if not, are we actually going where we ought to be going? Are we still 
on the right track with our efforts to assess the magnitude of the presumed externalities? 
Are our methods suitable after all? Or are we possibly in danger of spending much time 
and effort on obsolete analyses? In part, the article may be little more than a summary of 
what is written elsewhere in the literature. Nevertheless, in some crucial details it averts 
from long-lived thinking! In specific, it suggests that education is a private good with well 
defined property rights. Also, it once again emphasizes long-understood facts that have 
been repeated many times and are yet largely neglected. More precisely, for the case of 
tertiary education it is outlined that not the production of education per se, but its use in 
certain production processes, such as idea generation, is what yields externalities. All 
together, this article ought to provide an ideal starting point for future investigations in 
education externalities.  
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The essay has the following structure. Section 2 treats the basic concepts of 
teaching, education, human capital, and knowledge. It argues that education has the 
character of a private good, and it straightens up the common understanding of the 
educational production process. Subsequently, section 3 briefly repeats the essence of the 
externalities concept and reconsiders the role of potential externalities as the prime, if not 
the only, reason for a government to get involved with education finance. In section 4, 
potential externalities of education are looked at in greater detail. On the one hand, it 
focuses on their nature. The effect of education on economic growth is found to be the 
most controversial one. It is closest related to tertiary education. On the other hand, it 
contains a summary of the most relevant empirical contributions aimed at assessing the 
magnitude of growth externalities. Eventually, a discussion is provided on whether the 
latter may be internalized via the labor market (section 5). It is pointed out that the 
concept of externalities may well be overemphasized in the context of education. Instead, 
idea generation activities yield social benefits, which may indeed remain uncompensated. 
Section 6 concludes the paper and makes suggestions for further research. 
2. Clarification of concepts: teaching, education, human capital, and knowledge 
There has been much contemplation, and also confusion, regarding the issue of what 
type of good education actually is. Blaug (1970, p.16-22) argues that it may have 
consumption as well as investment characteristics. Also, there is no agreement as to 
whether education is a private, public or merit good (e.g. Rosen, 2005, p.70-71). If 
undergraduate microeconomic teaching is accepted to reflect the current doctrine, the least 
common denominator is that education is not publicly supported because of its potential 
public character, but because of its potential externalities (Pyndick and Rubinfeld, 2005, 
p.666). 
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From my perspective, the challenge to answer these questions arises primarily from 
the commingling of two different concepts. On the one hand, one could think of education 
as the educational programs provided by public and private educational institutions. I 
choose to refer to those as teaching or teaching services. On the other hand education 
might refer to the knowledge and skills inherent in a person after completing such a 
program of teaching. This is what I will actually call education henceforth. In my 
understanding the latter is equivalent to the term human capital as coined by Mincer 
(1958), Schultz (1960) and Becker (1964). Both terms will be used interchangeably 
throughout the remainder of this work. Of course, there are broader definitions of human 
capital. Usually the concept is conceived to include factors such as health and life 
expectancy. However, for most macroeconomic applications involving the concept of 
human capital, such as growth regressions or growth accounting exercises, it seems more 
practicable to think of it solely in terms of education. Health and life expectancy can be 
argued to be reflected in the size of the labor force. 
Teaching is a service offered for consumption to individuals who decide to get 
educated. If it is publicly provided and financed, and every individual has a right to 
participate in the programs, it has the character of a public good, being non-excludable 
and non-rival. In the case of primary or secondary education, for instance, excludability 
does obviously not apply, because schooling is mandatory. Higher education, however, is 
partly excludable given the existence of certain entrance requirements, making it at best a 
club good. One might argue that teaching is a rival good because a higher demand for 
teaching services increases class size and impairs the quality of the provided service. In 
the case of university programs, however, this argument is invalid, because the quality of 
a lecture does not depend much on the degree of teacher-student interactivity. I am 
inclined to reject this view for primary and secondary teaching as well. Empirical research 
suggests that class size is not an important determinant of how much a single student is 
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able to take away from a course (e.g. Hoxby, 2000). Moreover, the service provider is 
likely to offer the service to a fixed class size. Of course, in the case of a public provider, 
the administration may well have an incentive to reduce the number of teachers per 
student to a minimum. So, on average, the number of students in a class may tend to 
exceed the optimal size. Nevertheless, a threshold level probably exists beyond which the 
loss of teaching efficiency is too high to be tolerable even for a public provider. 
Summarizing, depending on its level, teaching is a public, or, at best, a club good. Not per 
se, though! Non-excludability is not guaranteed in the case of private provision. Public 
provision is what gives it this characteristic. 
In order to delimit teaching from education, it is practicable to treat it merely as one 
of multiple input factors to the process of personal human capital creation carried out by 
each individual student. I refer to the latter as the individual education production 
process. In this respect, teaching is just a fairly homogenous production factor in the 
production of education. The student's time and effort are additional inputs of this process. 
Time is an investment that may be evaluated in terms of foregone income, which could 
have been earned on the labor market instead (see Schultz, 1960). Whether the usage of 
teaching services reflects consumption or investment is not of importance for the present 
analyses. Certainly, Blaug (1970) is right in that it may have both characteristics. In any 
case, education is the outcome of this process. Contrary to what is widely believed (e.g. 
Rauch, 1993, p.380), it is a private good, for it can obviously not be shared and is 
perfectly rival and excludable. Every individual exclusively owns the property rights and 
has the ability to sell its personal human capital on the labor market. This is regardless of 
whether the teaching input was publicly or privately provided. Completing the production 
process analogy, the student may be viewed as the education producer. His/her capability 
may be comparable to the production technology or a productivity parameter; the higher 
individual capability, the more efficient the use of a given amount of input factors. Thus, 
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unlike the public good teaching, which is used as input, the final private good education 
(or human capital) is of rather heterogeneous quality.2 
In empirical macro-economic applications it makes sense to use quantitative 
measures as proxies for human capital. For instance, Barro and Lee (1993) suggest using 
the percentage of the population who has attained primary, secondary or tertiary degrees 
as the highest level of education. They also provide estimates of educational attainment as 
figures on years of schooling at all levels of education. It basically combines the three 
percentages into one score, making it operable for quantitative analyses. Of course, 
international comparability is subject to national differences in the requirements for a 
certain type of degree. Recently, however, the OECD Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) has made a more direct and internationally comparable 
measure of human capital quality available.3 The study, however, only covers children in 
school, not those who do not consume teaching services. Additionally, it is limited to the 
assessment of compulsory education; voluntary efforts to produce education have not 
been evaluated. Hence, in order to estimate an economy's stock of human capital, it seems 
most practicable to combine the data with quantitative measures. Alternatively, the index 
of labor force quality by Hanushek and Kimko (2000) may prove useful. For historical 
analyses, the concept of numeracy, which makes use of the age-heaping phenomenon, has 
been of help (A'Hearn, Baten and Crayen, 2006).4 
In order to further characterize the concept of education and/or human capital, it 
should be delimited from the concept of knowledge. I start by assigning the term 
worldwide stock of knowledge to the whole body of information that is available to 
mankind in the way that it has been written down and stored. As worldwide knowledge 
expands, however, some knowledge or skills may become obsolete. Or, more specifically, 
the quantity of information relevant to operate an economy is likely to persist. Eventually, 
human mental capacity is limited. Hence, some information has to be dismissed over 
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time. It will always remain accessible, for instance in books or on electronic media, but it 
will loose relevance for the operation of the economy. I refer to the fixed quantity of 
information and abilities necessary to operate an economy at a certain state of technology 
as the relevant stock of knowledge. Hence, the relevant knowledge is directly related to 
the current state of technology. It is available to everyone in the world without the 
possibility of exclusion and there are no rivalries involved in its usage. Consequently, 
teaching curricula are assumed to always be state-of-the-art in the way that they reflect 
this relevant body of information. Secondary schools are expected to convey a constant 
share of the relevant knowledge, which does not need to be quantified more concretely. 
University teaching allegedly covers the full body of relevant knowledge in a specific 
field, e.g. mechanical engineering. Current research and new insights presumably enter 
the teaching schedules without a time lag. I call the whole stock of knowledge offered 
through a specific teaching program the program knowledge. With the exception of 
primary programs it always contains a fixed fraction of the relevant stock of knowledge. 
Next, in my understanding, education denotes the output of personal knowledge and 
abilities a student was capable of creating relative to the potential amount that would be 
thinkable if the individual had perfect capability; given the inputs teaching and time. With 
perfect capability the student would not forget anything and be able to draw perfectly 
logical conclusions from the acquired mass of information, similar to a computer. Such a 
student would own the whole stock of knowledge offered through a specific teaching 
program. When earning a degree, he or she would deserve the best possible grade in every 
subject. Knowing that there are a bunch of other influencing factors determining grades, 
this simplification ought to illustrate the concept of a fictitious maximum of education 
producible given a certain type of teaching input. Given that the program knowledge is a 
fixed fraction of the relevant knowledge, it follows that the concept of education or 
human capital, as evaluated by the measures discussed in the previous paragraph, is 
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intertemporally consistent. If the transmitted knowledge as a fraction of the relevant 
knowledge varied from period to period, today's high school degree would constitute a 
different amount of human capital than tomorrow's high school degree. Romer (1990) 
puts it this way:  
 
"According to this specification, a college-educated engineer working today and one 
working 100 years ago have the same human capital, which is measured in terms of 
years of foregone participation in the labor market. The engineer working today is 
more productive because he or she can take advantage of all the additional 
knowledge accumulated as design problems were solved during the last 100 years" 
(p.S83-84).  
 
Hence, the assumptions made in this paragraph are crucial to have an operable 
concept of human capital at hand. 
3. Externalities as a reason for fiscal intervention 
3.1 The concept of externalities 
The first mention of the externality concept is usually attributed to Alfred Marshall 
(1922) whereas the credit and blame for utilizing it to explain government intervention 
often goes to Arthur Cecil Pigou (1920). Modern microeconomics textbooks describe 
externalities as the costs or benefits of a production or consumption activity that accrue to 
another party and are not reflected by the market price (e.g. Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2005, 
p.642). Typically they are thought to be the "consequence of the failure or inability to 
establish property rights" (Rosen, 2005, p.82). In this case the market solution is Pareto 
inefficient, because individuals who have an interest in the realization or the forbearance 
of the activity are prevented from offering or demanding payment for it. Respectively, the 
9 
amount produced or consumed is higher or lower than the social optimum. Ronald Coase 
(1960, p.7-8, 15-16) has stated that the efficient allocation may be reached independent of 
the prior assignment of property rights, if parties are able to negotiate about transactions 
at zero cost. Externalities will then automatically be internalized. This is of course under 
the premise that property rights do exist. If they don't, non-zero transaction costs are 
likely to suppress bargaining activities (Mueller, 2003, p.34-35). 
If private bargaining solutions do not work, government intervention can contribute 
to correcting the market failure basically via three ways: taxation or respectively 
subsidization, regulation (e.g. the setting of limits), and the definition of property rights 
(e.g. in the form of certificates). In an insightful working paper, Barnett and Yandle 
(2005), however, recognize that there may be "far fewer instances of unaddressed external 
costs" (p.2) than is commonly taken for granted. From their point of view, the externality 
concept has frequently been misunderstood, which "leads to gross overemphasis on 
externalities as sources of 'market failure'" (p.6). They go as far as saying that "our 
understanding of the nature and importance of externality has advanced very little over 
the last 100 years" (p.3). As a result, they even find that "the externality problem has 
disappeared, but it has been replaced by the public goods problem" (p.3). In other words, 
any externality problem emerges only if a public good is either exploited or created by 
production or consumption activities. Hence, it may be regarded as a public good issue. 
Irrespective of whether externalities associated with the production, respectively 
consumption, of a good or its public character are the reason for fiscal intervention, it is 
difficult for the state to assess the scope of support needed to achieve the Pareto optimal 
solution. It has been argued that certain voting rules in a democracy may serve to 
automatically generate the optimal level of public spending on a public good. This is a 
case related to the median voter argument harkening back to Downs (1957), according to 
which the preferences of the median voter decide over actual political decisions. 
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Politicians are thought to be the marionettes of society; for the sake of staying in power 
they adjust their policy proposals to the preferences of the median voter. Additionally, if 
votes could be traded, side-payments to voters could "buy" deviations from the socially 
optimal decisions. Externalities might then be bargained away in the political process and 
the level of government subsidies would reflect the optimal choice of the electorate. The 
latter could be guided by many other than just monetary motives. If this was true, further 
economic analysis attempting to quantify externalities would become obsolete. For a 
number of reasons, however, this is not identical with reality. Politicians and parties do 
have some power and offer only a limited range of choices to select from. Moreover, 
voters’ behavior is probably far from rational in many cases. It seems that, often, personal 
characteristics of politicians or the general ideology of a party are more important for a 
voting decision than political agendas. And not rarely a topic completely unrelated to 
other agenda points, dominates the election campaigns and thereby the voting decisions. 
Also, the specific bundling of public service offers in a political proposal may make it 
impossible to achieve a Pareto optimal outcome on every single public good. And finally, 
spending on public services could be inefficiently high because of X-inefficiency or 
bureaucracy. A more extensive treatment of collective decision making and its role for 
public service provision can be found in Mueller (2003), Cullis and Jones (1998, p.45-70) 
or Rosen (2005, p.111-140). As a consequence of this policy failure, economists keep 
spending much effort assessing the magnitude of externalities to give governments a 
guideline for determining the optimal scope of fiscal activities. 
3.2 Other reasons for fiscal intervention 
At the outset of this article it was argued that the equivocality regarding the 
magnitude of externalities is responsible for the irregular patterns of spending on teaching 
purposes across countries. This can only be true if externalities are the only - or at least 
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prime - reason for a state to get involved with the financing of teaching services. But 
aren't there other objectives a state might pursue through its financial activities? Musgrave 
(1959) names three major functions of fiscal actions: distribution, allocation, and 
stabilization. Musgrave and Musgrave (1984, p.7-16) essentially summarize those 
functions as follows. 
The distribution function justifies fiscal interventions that aim at altering the income 
distribution, usually in a progressive way, by channeling resources from the wealthier to 
the less wealthy individuals in the population. The question of a just or fair distribution is 
subject to philosophical considerations. Certainly the actual scope of redistributive 
government spending depends on how the electorate perceives the degree of inequality in 
the economy. Meltzer and Richard (1981) argue that voters demand a greater extent of 
redistribution activities if the income distribution is less equal. Nevertheless, it is not 
obvious that subsidies to teaching institutions serve this purpose well. In general, 
redistribution is implemented most directly by a tax-transfer-scheme. Usually, progressive 
income taxes or taxes on luxury goods are instruments on the revenue side of the public 
fiscal system ensuring that resources for the provision of any public service provision are 
mainly derived from the wealthy. Additionally, looking at the expenditure side, public 
services or transfers may be targeted at specifically needy groups. It seems, however, that 
transfers like social welfare or public housing are much more self-evident instruments in 
this respect than publicly provided teaching services. Primary and tertiary programs are 
not restricted to the poor and, tertiary teaching has in fact been argued to entail regressive 
re-distributive effects (Hansen and Weisbrod, 1969; Blaug, 1982). In other words, if 
redistribution is the goal of fiscal activity, there are certainly more efficient ways to 
achieve it than financing teaching services. Hence, the redistribution function does not 
play an important role in the justification of public education subsidies. If anything, it 
might just be the second consideration. Further on, if the existence of externalities 
12 
requires public subsidies, the entailed re-distributional effects may have to be tolerated; in 
fact they may just be interpreted as desirable in this case. 
The stability motivation describes the intention to mitigate substantial fluctuations 
of the economy and maintain objectives like high employment and price level stability. 
No separate activity, however, can be named as an instrument to achieve this goal. Rather, 
it is the scope of the whole budget, respectively the budget deficits or surpluses, which 
exerts the stabilizing influence. Consequently, thinking of teaching expenditures as a 
financial activity that is intended to smooth out the short-term economic development 
does not seem plausible. 
Finally, the allocation function justifies financial intervention in order to correct 
market failure. The latter may be due to the public character of a good or due to 
externalities arising from its consumption or production. Because teaching programs are 
not per se public goods, but obtain this character only if they are indeed provided 
publicly, solely externalities are suitable to validate the allocation function when sorting 
out a reason for publicly financing those programs. Or, as Pyndick and Rubinfeld (2005) 
put it, "public education is provided […] because it entails positive externalities, not 
because it is a public good".  
Hence, if there was any reason for the government to get involved with the 
financing of teaching institutions, it follows from the discussion that it could only be 
potentially existing externalities. In the political discussions centering tuition fees, other 
reasons have frequently been exploited as arguments against a private contribution to 
university education. Those are primarily the imperfection of credit markets, which 
prevents students to borrow money against their human capital, and the principal-agent 
problem between parents and children, stating that the former may make decisions that are 
disadvantageous to the child. Both cases, however, do not necessarily justify financial 
intervention. Other solutions involving regulatory policy are much more self-evident. This 
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is why externalities are the essential concept when it comes to judging the scope of public 
subsidies. 
4. Education externalities 
4.1 Nature 
Section 2 has straightened up the concepts of teaching, education and knowledge. 
Obviously, the pure consumption of teaching does not guarantee the successful 
production of the good education. With this in mind, the question arises whether potential 
externalities are generated from the consumption of teaching services or from the 
production of individually bound education. The answer depends on the type of 
externality. I distinguish stability externalities and growth externalities.  
First consider stability externalities. Educated people are supposed to benefit others 
by having a lower probability of performing criminal activities and by making more 
informed political decisions. Both effects presumably contribute to the stability of a 
society. They are commonly linked to primary and secondary education. The individual 
education producers, however, are not compensated for those external benefits, which is 
why the produced amount of primary and secondary education is generally thought to be 
lower than the social optimum. The Pigouvian way to solve this problem is to subsidize 
the production of education. One might go as far as saying that the grants should be bound 
to the success of the production process. In practice, however, it is the consumption of 
teaching services, which is publicly supported. And indeed, in the case of primary and 
secondary programs, even the pure consumption of teaching services may cause the 
mentioned externalities. Consider a situation without any fiscal contribution. If families 
had to pay for teaching services, there would be no way it could be made mandatory. 
Private institutions would emerge, probably offering very diverse and rather expensive 
teaching services. The wealthier would send their children to private schools; the poorer 
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would go to the cheaper public schools. Some, however, would not attend school at all. 
Additionally, there are other reasons why parents might not necessarily act in the interest 
of their children and send them to school if it was not mandatory. Of course, this can not 
be in the interest of a society, because it jeopardizes its stability. Public financing gives 
society the possibility to control the curricula and ensure that children receive a social 
imprint compatible with the internal institutions (i.e. the values) of the society (Rosen, 
2005, p.71). These benefits, however, do not depend on the success of the education 
process. The pure presence of children in schools allows exerting some control over their 
development. It must be for this reason, why most societies have decided to provide 
primary and secondary teaching on a public basis. The literature frequently mentions 
other social benefits, such as the reduced likelihood of an educated person to receive 
public transfers or the positive environmental effects (Moretti, 2003). Other examples 
include longevity, health and fertility. In some cases it is disputable whether those effects 
can be internalized or not. Nevertheless, all together it seems to be widely recognized that 
public financing of primary and secondary teaching is justified. 
The most frequently cited effect of human capital, however, is its important role in 
the process of economic development. More specifically, educated individuals drive the 
growth of an economy. Endogenous growth theory has been investigating this aspect 
since the late 1980s. Deferring the question whether these growth externalities are really 
just side-effects that remain uncompensated, the next paragraphs treat two accepted ways 
in which human capital influences the growth process.  
According to Lucas (1988) it takes on the role of an additional production factor 
besides capital and uneducated labor. It augments the productivity of workers. In this 
model, enduring economic growth can only be achieved via the growth of the input 
factors. For instance a higher amount of human capital takes an economy to a higher level 
of income per capita. Some authors have referred to this as the level effect of education. In 
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a way, the model simply splits up the exogenous productivity parameter of the well-
known model by Solow (1965) in an exogenous and an endogenous part. The growth of 
the latter is explained by the growth in the human capital stock. Of course, unlimited 
growth potential of the human capital stock is the premise for sustainable growth rates 
being feasible. This is realized by assuming that the accumulation of human capital in the 
education sector is subject to constant marginal returns. The change in the stock of human 
capital in each period is proportional to the level of human capital already attained. It 
further depends on the fraction of time a worker spends in the education sector as 
opposed to the production sector. What follows is a repetition of the cited level effect 
taking the economy to ever new levels of output in each period. The growth path is 
determined by the fraction of human capital diverged from the production sector in every 
period.  
Possibly, the characterization of human capital as being able to grow without bound 
has its origin in the adaptation of an early endogenous growth model by Uzawa (1965). 
Additional to education, Uzawa explicitly considers technological knowledge, health, etc. 
as factors that improve labor efficiency; i.e. in other words, everything that is included in 
the exogenous productivity parameter in the Solow model. Of course it is plausible to 
assume that the sum of these factors can grow boundlessly. Borrowing this assumption 
and applying it to his concept of human capital, however, Lucas (1988) disregards the 
difference between an economy's aggregated stock of human capital and its knowledge 
(also see Romer, 1990, p.S79). Given the grasp of human capital as applied in this article, 
human capital cannot grow without bound, because it is defined in terms of skills acquired 
by individuals relative to the relevant knowledge. The pure advancement of skills does not 
necessarily augment a worker's productivity. It may merely reflect an advancement of 
technology and knowledge which requires workers to be more skillful. Only if skills 
advance faster than technology and knowledge, human capital and thereby worker 
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productivity is carried to a higher level. Hence, instead of thinking about Lucas' model as 
explaining lasting growth effects of human capital, I prefer to look at it as attributing 
some of the productivity shifts, which were entirely exogenous in Solow's theory, to an 
increase in the human capital stock (i.e. skill growth exceeding knowledge growth). Lucas 
(1988) distinguishes two different types of the described level effects. He calls the effect 
of an individual's human capital on his own productivity the internal effect, but argues 
that it may also have a productivity enhancing external effect on all other production 
factors that might not be taken into consideration when negotiating the wages of educated 
workers.5 Hence, too little human capital may be accumulated. Obviously, potential 
externalities related to the level effect of human capital do require that the individuals 
successfully produce education. The pure consumption of - or investment in - tertiary 
programs does clearly not go along with those type of external benefits. If anything, the 
free-rider problem associated with public goods may entail negative externalities from the 
consumption activities. For instance, unsuccessful university students harm the economy 
by staying away from the labor market and evading their contribution to the fiscal system. 
The part of the economic growth, which is based on improvements of production 
technologies, remains exogenous in the Lucas (1988) model. It only states that an 
economy can adopt the new production technology and move to a higher level if the stock 
of human capital is sufficient. Admittedly, this partly makes sense, because technology 
(i.e. knowledge) is developed on the world market and a single economy's influence may 
be marginal. Nevertheless, to a certain extent, homemade technology may drive growth in 
an economy. Romer (1990) explains why even in this respect, human capital plays a 
crucial role. After the potential labor force members have decided how much time to 
spend in the education sector, the next decision concerns the allocation of human capital 
to the research sector and the production sector. The share allocated to the research and 
development sector determines the capability of an economy to create new ideas or 
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innovations. The fraction allocated to the production sector decides about the level of 
technology that may be employed in the production of goods. It is important to note that 
research should be understood in a way that includes research activities for the purpose of 
technology adoption from abroad. Of course, it is likely that the adoption of existing 
technologies requires a lower amount of research activities than generating an innovation 
from scratch. Further, just like the education sector, the research sector should not be 
defined in terms of institutions such as universities, but rather in terms of activities that 
are directed towards the development of designs for producer durables. Those may 
include research at universities, at public or private research institutes or the R&D efforts 
in private enterprises. 
Now, the optimal allocation of the human capital stock to the production and the 
research sector is the one that maximizes the total (i.e. present and future) consumption 
possibilities. Note that the size of the human capital stock is now exogenously given. It 
determines the knowledge growth rate, which is equal to the economic growth rate, and 
acts as a scale factor. Hence, according to Romer (1990), education - and tertiary 
education is the most relevant in this context - also exerts a growth effect via its 
employment in research activities. If both usages of human capital were compensated 
according to their marginal productivity, one would not need to worry about externalities. 
In Romer's model the price of a design (patent price) does mirror the potential effect of 
the according innovation on growth. The same applies for the potential growth effect of 
adopting a technology. Hence, one might argue that externalities from applied research 
can be internalized and that only basic research is problematic. However, the knowledge 
spillovers, which are entailed in idea generation, increase the productivity of every future 
researcher in the world. And this fact is not reflected in the patent price, because ideas and 
innovations have the character of a public good. This is true for basic research as well as 
applied research. After property right protection has expired, ideas are non-rival and non-
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excludable.6 Even though a more or less extensive time lag may be involved, sooner or 
later everyone in the world will have access. Romer (1990) himself states that "there is 
little doubt that much of the value to society of any given innovation or discovery is not 
captured by the inventor […]" (1990, p.S89). Also, he argues that "an additional design 
raises the productivity of all future individuals who do research, but because this benefit is 
nonexcludable, it is not reflected at all in the market price for designs. […] these effects 
cause human capital to be undercompensated" (p.S96). In his model, even if the socially 
optimal amount of human capital is accumulated opposite to the suggestion made by 
Lucas (1988), the cited effects may get in the way of the socially efficient allocation of 
human capital to the research and development sector. Hence, growth externalities may 
arise from the production of innovations and ideas (i.e. the use of human capital in the 
research sector) rather than from the pure production of education or the consumption of 
teaching services. Romer (1990) expects "that too little human capital is devoted to 
research" (p.S96). He brings forward that public subsidies can be a way to achieve the 
optimal allocation. Unfortunately, Romer (1990) does not make clear what should 
actually be subsidized. On the one hand he writes that the "social optimum can be 
achieved by subsidizing the accumulation of A" (p.S97), that is knowledge. In different 
places, however, he favors to "subsidize the accumulation of human capital" (p.S99) or 
advocates "a subsidy to employment in the research sector" (p.S96). According to Barnett 
and Yandle (2005, p.11), failure to recognize which is the "asset for which use gives rise 
to external effects" is responsible for much disagreement regarding the nature and 
existence of externalities. In the present case, this asset is the public good knowledge, and 
not education itself or teaching services! Pigou himself mentions scientific research as the 
"most important" source of positive externalities:  
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"Lastly and most important of all, it is true of resources and activities devoted 
alike to the fundamental problems of scientific research, out of which in 
unexpected ways discoveries of high practical utility often grow, and also to the 
perfecting of inventions and improvements in industrial processes. These latter are 
often of such a nature that they can neither be patented nor kept secret, and 
therefore, the whole of the extra reward which they at first bring to their inventor 
is very quickly transferred from him to the general public […]" (1920, p.161).  
 
Education, however, remains unnoticed.  
In summary, stability externalities are associated with the pure consumption of 
primary and secondary teaching services and are in general thought to justify full public 
financing of programs on these levels. Further on, growth externalities according to Lucas 
(1988) - level effects - concern all levels of education. But because primary and secondary 
subsidies are by and large non-controversial, they are most relevant in the context of 
tertiary education. Successfully produced education is what generates them. Hence, 
strictly speaking, the allocation function of fiscal activity merely serves to justify 
subsidies to successful students rather than to anyone who is enrolled at a university. And 
finally, growth externalities introduced by Romer (1990) - growth effects - are closest 
linked to tertiary programs. Nevertheless, they actually arise from knowledge generation 
processes and are neither directly associated with teaching nor with education. In this 
respect, it is questionable why university teaching receives considerable subsidies in many 
countries.  
4.2 Magnitude 
In order to assess the scope of public subsidies, education externalities need to be 
quantified. As exemplified, the public financing of primary and secondary programs is 
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widely accepted because of stability externalities. In consequence, the empirical attempts 
of quantification are limited to the influence of education on economic growth. There is 
an extensive body of literature that empirically investigates the role of human capital in 
the process of economic development via different methods, such as growth accounting 
(e.g. Young, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1996) or growth regressions (e.g. Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil, 1992; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Barro, 2001; Pritchett, 2001); Sianesi and van 
Reenen (2003) provide an overview over the literature on the macroeconomic effect of 
education. The vital question, however, is whether the education owners actually receive 
remuneration for this side-effect of deploying their human capital. This aspect has been 
the subject of research efforts much less frequently. Two types of studies will be 
discussed subsequently. Both focus solely on the Lucasian level effect of human capital. 
The principal idea underlying both approaches is to contrast the private return to 
education (i.e. the effect of individual education levels on individual income) with the 
social return (i.e. the effect of average human capital levels on everyone's income). 
The first approach basically aims at reconciling micro-estimates of the private return 
to education and macro-estimates of the social return to education. Some endeavors 
include the work by Heckman and Klenow (1997), Krueger and Lindahl (2001) as well as 
Gundlach and Woessmann (2004). The private return is in line with what Lucas (1988) 
calls the internal effect of human capital. Most studies derive it from applying the 
standard earnings equation suggested by Mincer (1974) to micro data. It can be 
interpreted as the increase in personal income associated with one additional year of 
schooling, when experience is controlled for in the equation. For instance, Pscharopoulos 
(1973; 1994) has contributed much to the evaluation of private returns to education. 
Harmon, Oosterbeek, and Walker (2000) provide a summary of the literature on the 
microeconomic returns to education. As an example, one year of schooling in the United 
States increases individual income on average by 10% (see Psacharopulous and Patrinos, 
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2002, Table A.2). The social return, as estimated by the mentioned studies, includes both 
the internal and the external effect of human capital modeled by Lucas (1988). In order to 
obtain a coefficient that is comparable to the private return, usually the authors make use 
of what Heckman and Klenow (1997) call the macro-Mincer equation. Essentially, this is 
a Mincer equation applied to countries instead of individuals. Nevertheless, due to 
technical issues there is considerable dissension on the size of the estimated social return. 
Comparing this macro estimate with the widely recognized 10%-estimate of the micro 
return, Heckman and Klenow (1997) reject the existence of externalities. Gundlach and 
Woessmann (2004) instead obtain a figure for the social return in excess of that for the 
private return and conclude that externalities do exist. Similarly, Krueger and Lindahl 
(2001) estimate a macro effect which is about four times the size of the micro effect. But 
it is just this huge difference which makes them suspicious of their own results. They 
argue the finding was most likely a result of endogeneity bias, which leads them to 
recommend focusing on natural experiments that cause increases in educational 
attainment. 
A second strand of literature focuses solely on evidence from micro data. Basically, 
these studies estimate the effect of the average level of education in a city or a state on 
individual wage levels within this regional unit, controlling for individual education. 
Observation units are individuals, clustered by cities, states or countries. The estimation 
equations could also be interpreted as Mincer equations augmented with the regional 
average level of human capital. Important examples include Rauch (1993), Rudd (2000), 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), Moretti (2004), Muravyev (2006), as well as Ciccone and 
Peri (2006). Because individual education is controlled for, the effect of the average 
human capital level on individual wages represents the social effect of education that goes 
beyond the private return. Hence, the authors typically interpret it directly as the size of 
externalities. In other words, both the internal as well as the external effect from the Lucas 
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(1988) model are estimated based on a single equation. Given the differing empirical 
specifications the findings of the studies are not directly comparable. Rauch (1993) finds 
that a one percentage point increase of average education in US cities raises wages by 3-
5%. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) are skeptical in light of their weak evidence for an 
effect of compulsory secondary schooling laws on the US state wage levels. Also, Rudd 
(2000) finds no support for an effect of average education on individual wages in a panel 
analysis for US states. Eventually, Muravyev (2006) exploits a natural experiment 
provided by the economic transition process in Russia and concludes that a one percent 
increase in the college share in Russian Cities raises residents' wages by 1.5%. A criticism 
brought forward against these studies states that the increase of wages in a firm, a region, 
or a state may just be due to the imperfect substitutability of uneducated labor, given the 
production technology. If a certain state of technology requires a fixed amount of 
uneducated labor, an increase in the average share of educated workers will drive up the 
wages of uneducated workers and possibly the average wage as well. As long as educated 
and uneducated workers are paid according to their marginal productivity, this effect does 
by no means indicate an externality. Moretti (2004) attacks this problem by estimating the 
effect on the wage levels for three separate groups of workers: high school drop-outs, high 
school graduates, and college graduates. He finds that not only wages in the first two 
groups rise with a higher share of college graduates in the cluster, but also the salaries of 
the latter do react in a positive way. A one percentage point increase in the supply of 
college graduates elevates the wage level in the same group by 0.4%; a rather weak effect. 
Eventually, Ciccone and Peri (2006) tackle the problem of imperfect substitutability by 
what they call the constant-composition approach. This method estimates the effect of 
changes in the supply of human capital on the (log-)change in average wages holding the 
skill-composition constant. It does not reveal any evidence for positive externalities. 
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Summarizing, the empirical evidence on educational growth externalities is limited 
to Lucasian level effects. There are (to my best knowledge) no studies, which try to 
empirically reconcile the Romer-type growth effects with the private return to researchers. 
Typically, the surveys are based on comparisons of the private and the social return to 
education. Unambiguous results, however, have not been achieved so far.  
5. Discussion 
5.1 Internalization of level effects 
In light of the ambiguity on potential Lucasian externalities and the lack of 
empirical studies on Romerian externalities, it is imperative to ask whether a priori there 
is actually a reason to suspect that education owners might not receive the appropriate 
compensation for supplying human capital on the labor market. What should prevent the 
internalization of external benefits that is expected to take place if property rights are well 
defined? 
I start my case by introducing the concept of an optimal human capital stock. 
Intuitively, most researchers would probably agree that there must be something like an 
optimal size of the human capital stock for production purposes. Depending on a country's 
state of technology, employers in this country may have a rather well defined need for 
educated labor. Neither do they want too little, nor too much of it. In the original Lucas 
(1988) model this point does not get clear, because the notion of human capital is one that 
incorporates knowledge. Whereas technology remains exogenous, human capital - 
including knowledge - is a production factor that may grow without bound and thereby 
drive productivity. The Romer (1990) model on the other hand, distinguishes between 
knowledge and human capital. It clarifies that technology is equivalent to the knowledge 
of an economy and that its growth rate is connected with the level of human capital. 
Nevertheless, the size of the human capital stock is exogenous. It may not grow along 
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with technology. Merely, the amount of human capital allocated to the production sector 
is allowed to adjust endogenously in the process of technological development. Hence, 
notwithstanding of both models' strengths in illustrating growth and level effects of 
human capital, they fail to capture the fairly intuitive notion of an optimal size of the 
human capital stock that is directly associated with the state of technology. 
This notion easily applies to a dynamic context. The amount of uneducated labor (or 
time respectively) invested in the education sector, determines the rate of change in the 
human capital stock. Note, by the way, that this view deviates from Lucas' (1988) model, 
where not uneducated, but educated labor is allocated between the education and the 
production sector. Much more realistically, however, it ought to be uneducated workers, 
who make the decision how to allocate their time. During the production process in the 
education sector they create human capital, which ultimately enters the aggregate 
production function. The education sector encompasses all types of individual activities 
that may lead to an officially accepted educational degree. Now, if much uneducated labor 
is diverged from the production sector in order to build human capital, there may be too 
little left to pursue the optimal path of output growth. Nothing, however, is said about the 
nature of the relationship between the state of technology and the amount of educated 
labor needed in the production process. A technological innovation must not necessarily 
require more educated labor in relation to uneducated labor. The opposite may well be the 
case. Or no change might be needed at all. The amount of human capital produced in each 
period ought to be just right to keep the human capital stock at its optimal level! Given the 
understanding of education laid out in section 2, the fraction of time an uneducated 
worker spends in the education sector until successful completion of a program is a close 
proxy for his or her level of education. And assuming that the distributions of individual 
capability and students' effort are equal in all countries, "years of schooling" is a very 
suitable measure of human capital in cross-country applications. Based on this measure, 
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Krueger and Lindahl (2001) have delivered empirical evidence for the notion of an 
optimal human capital stock. They detect a curvilinear relationship between average years 
of schooling and GDP growth rates for the OECD countries. In fact, they argue, the 
optimum level of education, measured in terms of overall years of schooling, has already 
been surpassed in the average OECD country (p.1130). 
Not much creativity is needed to reconcile the notion of an optimal stock of human 
capital with my adoption of the Lucas model stated in section 4.1: rather than interpreting 
the level effect of human capital on the aggregate output as driving productivity growth as 
suggested by Lucas (1988), I prefer to look at it as an adjustment reaction of the human 
capital stock to its optimal level determined by technological progress. The latter may 
either be due to innovations being adopted from abroad, or based on improvements 
created by the economy's own research sector.7 Typically, catch-up growth of less 
developed countries is explained that way. Because technology is available worldwide, all 
that is needed for those countries to catch up is a functioning education sector. As stated 
earlier, some applied research activities might also be required to adopt technologies. But 
apart from that, it is important that the labor force is skilled to operate this technology. 
However, the productivity enhancing effect of human capital in the presence of 
technological advancements, and the entailed adjustment of national output levels, is 
likely to be compensated on the labor market. Given the notion of an optimal stock of 
human capital in the production process, it is hard to think of reasons that could prevent 
individuals from exploiting their property rights when offering human capital on the labor 
market. After all, employers decide how much a certain type of education is worth to 
them. An excess supply of tertiary education in the production sector might beat down its 
price. Vice versa, if only few educated workers are available, their ability to negotiate 
higher wages rises. A priori, the price mechanism is expected to work and provide for the 
optimal amount of human capital being supplied.8 Nothing suggests that the wage 
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differential between educated and uneducated labor would not reflect the differences in 
the respective marginal productivities. According to Lucas, educated individuals stimulate 
each others' productivity simply by communicating with each other. This seems odd 
however. If they occur within a firm, the spillovers are likely to be compensated by the 
employer. But that should also remain true for spillovers in cities, or regions arising from 
this type of interaction. If educated workers really have a higher probability to learn from 
each other, even beyond firms and cities, employers may be very aware of this specific 
characteristic of the production factor human capital. At the end of the day it is 
implausible to assume that this feature is not recognized and compensated for. 
5.2 Criticism of empirical surveys 
Based on the previous discussion, some criticism is advisable regarding the method 
of comparing private and social returns to education to assess the magnitude of 
externalities.9 
I start with the studies reconciling micro- and macro-evidence. Whereas this 
approach appears rather intuitive and simple at first glance, it is not at all clear why it 
should have the ability to testify the existence of externalities. First of all, consider a 
given positive social return to education. Say it was estimated from a cross-section of 
countries. It states, as a percentage, by how much a relatively poor country's national 
income would grow, if the average years of schooling in the population increased by one 
year. Note that this shift could either reflect the higher productivity of workers, or the 
possibility to employ more advanced technologies in the production process because 
workers are better trained to implement those. In both cases, the higher output level is the 
result of a more efficient aggregate production process. As previously argued, however, 
there is no reason to believe that this increase in worker efficiency would not be 
recognized and compensated by the employer. At least some suspicious fact would be 
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needed as a hint that human capital property rights are not fully owned by the individuals. 
So, a priori it is hardly conceivable that workers do not get paid for this. Now assume, the 
private return, estimated based on a Mincer-type equation, was zero or at least very low. 
This makes a statement about how current labor income differences depend on the level of 
individual education. Because those differences reflect the expectations of employers 
regarding the future productive value of educated and uneducated labor as well as the 
scarcity of educated labor, the low return might just be a hint on an excess supply of 
human capital in relation to uneducated labor. And it may well be compatible with the 
positive macro return estimated for a cross-section of countries, which reflects the whole 
past influence of human capital on the historical development of those economies. If the 
private return sags below the social return, this may rather be a reaction of the labor 
market to the negative externalities of a human capital surplus. It does not indicate 
positive education externalities! Similarly, if the wage differentials were highly dependent 
on education and the private return surpassed the social return, this would just illustrate 
how much employers value education rather than indicate negative externalities! 
Furthermore, the empirically determined wage differentials may be biased by 
already existing public subsidies. The flat wage structure may just be an indication of a 
potential crowding out. If compensation for growth effects was provided by the market, it 
seems plausible that government subsidies replace the market compensation if they are 
provided beyond the presence of externalities. The wages of academics might be 
substantially higher, if students had to pay for university teaching! If, in the absence of 
externalities, the public contribution serves to crowd out private resources that would 
have potentially been invested in the production of education, it would also be hard to 
judge the potential level of education with no public intervention. Intuitively, it would be 
expected to be just as high! Hence, an empirical analysis needs to be based on a real world 
scenario where teaching finance is solely private. There is no such country, but a few 
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come close to this ideal case. In the United States for instance the public contribution to 
tertiary teaching is distinctly smaller than in most European countries (see Figure 2). 
Now, if positive externalities of education did exist, one would necessarily expect a lower 
demand for teaching services in the country with lower teaching subsidies. Nevertheless 
the demand for teaching services seems to be higher in the US. Even though they have to 
pay for tertiary programs, more students decide to invest in college or university teaching 
than anywhere in Europe. Of course, one must regard the fact that the US does not have a 
system of vocational training. In European countries the latter soaks up many high school 
graduates whose counterparts in the US enjoy college teaching. Nevertheless the high 
demand for tertiary teaching suggests that college education pays off for the individuals. 
This fact sheds doubt on the existence of educational growth externalities. Much more 
likely, young individuals do seem to perceive the manifold benefits from education to 
outweigh the cost they need to incur for the teaching program. Hence, not unlikely, public 
subsidies in countries with high public contributions serve to crowd out private resources 
and flatten the wage structure. This effect can easily be reconciled with the Krueger-
Lindahl finding indicating a schooling surplus in OECD countries: If there was too much 
education on the market due to excessive subsidization, it would not be surprising at all to 
find flat wage differentials, i.e. private returns lower than the social returns. Consider an 
exogenous increment in the time fraction each worker spends in the education sector. Say, 
for instance, due to a rise in public subsidies the number of students increases in the 
subsequent periods. This entails an increase of the human capital stock. When the first 
graduates of this new student generation hit the labor market they will be confronted with 
lower than expected wages, because there are more graduates than required by the current 
state of production technology. That way public subsidies to teaching programs substitute 
part of the labor market wage of university graduates. 
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Also, the micro-based estimation of social and private returns via one single 
equation has a caveat. Admittedly, this approach eliminates some technical problems 
associated with the comparison of coefficients from micro and macro regressions. 
Moreover, the authors of the surveys discussed in section 4.2 demonstrate creativity in 
exploiting natural experiments and utilizing instruments that allow dealing with the 
endogeneity problem. But they neglect that educated workers might nevertheless get 
compensated for their effect on others' productivity. Even evaluating the effect of average 
human capital levels on individual wages for three separate groups of workers (Moretti, 
2004) does not imply that wage differentials do not reflect the differences in marginal 
productivities of workers. Of course, a higher share of educated labor in a regional unit 
may enable employers belonging to this unit to implement a more sophisticated 
production technology. The latter might augment the productivity of workers across all 
levels of education. Nevertheless, if a technology is available and an employer is waiting 
to apply it, he or she would be expected to take into account the productivity enhancing 
effect of higher-skilled labor. Again, there is no reason to suspect that he or she would 
offer wages to educated workers that do not reflect their marginal productivity in the 
renovated production process. Hence, an increase of wages in each of the three groups 
may well be in line with a wage differential that serves to compensate educated workers 
for their productivity enhancing effects. In other word, it does not indicate externalities. 
The same argument applies to the remedy applied by Ciccone and Peri (2006). A positive 
reaction of changes in the overall skill level even after a controlling for the skill-
composition may be due to the adoption of a technology that increases the productivity of 
all levels of education. 
Concluding, apart from the technical deficiencies associated with both the 
estimation of the micro-effect and the macro-effect - above all endogeneity problems - the 
whole concept of comparing private and social returns is very misleading. It does by no 
30 
means provide evidence for the presumption that workers are not compensated 
sufficiently for bringing their human capital into the aggregated production process. In 
summary, quantification trials to date can not be viewed as successful. Furthermore, the 
recorded surveys highlight the Lucas-type level effects of human capital only. As 
previously argued, it is most questionable why those should not be internalized on the 
labor market.  
5.3 Assessing growth effects 
All together, human capital does not per se yield externalities. Its level effects can 
most likely be internalized and the growth effects arise from idea generation. Hence, 
subsidizing its pure accumulation does not make sense. The market is expected to deliver 
the optimal solution for the allocation between production and education sector, because it 
is likely that employers compensate skilled workers for their ability to meet the demands 
associated with complex production technologies. No reason is obvious, why the prices 
for human capital in those two sectors should not be optimal. Subsidies may actually be 
detrimental, because the overall size of the human capital stock could be pushed to an 
inefficiently high level and cause negative externalities. Supporting the idea generation 
process in turn, which uses human capital as an input, would make it at the same time 
more attractive for individuals to produce education. But what scope of subsidies is 
needed to achieve the optimal allocation of human capital to the research and 
development sector? And what is the optimal allocation? How do you know how much 
more research activity at the expense of production activities a country needs? This 
question is not easy to answer.  
First bear in mind that national income or its growth rate may not solely determine 
the well-being of a nation. What if non-monetary effects are taken into account? After all, 
growth might be perceived as a negative externality by a significant fraction of a state's 
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population. If growth increases inequality - and in light of the empirical evidence only 
few would doubt that this is the case - the less wealthy populace might actually feel 
threatened by economic growth. Similarly, environmental consequences of growth may be 
recognized negatively. When considering such intangible effects, the assessment of 
externalities becomes virtually impossible. The only indicator to rely on would then be 
public votes. True, the case that votes do not necessarily turn out Pareto efficient remains 
valid. But is there really any other way to judge the preferences of people? There is a 
reason why people vote the way they do. In specific, the poor might vote in favor of 
public teaching subsidies for re-distributional purposes, because inequality is costly to 
them in a psychological way. If the electorate grants subsidies, it might do it for a reason. 
In this respect, the redistributional and the efficiency-related motivation for fiscal activity 
become identical. On the contrary, if in an election a society votes in favor of tuition fees, 
this is nothing but a hint that either presumed externalities, be it future growth potential or 
crime reduction, are not perceived by the bulk of the populace or are valued lower than 
the current level of subsidies would imply. In other words, if people primarily strive for 
happiness, and if material prosperity is not the prime determinant of happiness (Layard, 
2005), then it is hard to see why votes should not reflect the multi-faceted needs of 
individuals in a society. In this case, all public finance problems would be degraded from 
a theoretical economic problem to a rather practical socio-political issue. And it would 
merely inhere a positive but no longer a normative dimension. Hence, when setting aside 
the argument of policy failure brought forward in section 3.1, looking at votes may 
provide a useful reality check to assess the preferences of the electorate.  
Not only can intangible negative externalities lead to an overestimation of the 
optimal scope of research activities. Additionally, non-monetary rewards to workers 
performing research activities may cause underestimation of the return to this use of 
human capital. First, it is likely that motivation for research activities is primarily of an 
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intrinsic nature. The reward comes from the satisfying character of the activity by itself 
rather than from external incentives such as pecuniary compensation. Undoubtedly, 
research activities require more creative talent than others. Creativity in turn is presumed 
to be higher when individuals are intrinsically motivated. Hence, it makes sense to assume 
that researchers have a higher degree of intrinsic motivation than other workers. In fact, 
external rewards have been argued to crowd out intrinsic motivation and reduce creativity 
(Amabile, 1983). 
Second, even external incentives may be intangible. For instance, few would doubt 
that recognition is a crucial factor driving researchers' motivation. In other words, even if 
large externalities existed that researchers were not paid for (money-wise), a reason for 
fiscal intervention is not necessarily posed. 
Given this criticism, it is moot whether quantification attempts of growth 
externalities can ever be successful. Nevertheless, ignoring the possibilities that growth 
may not be the ultimate determinant of well-being, that collective choice may internalize 
any externality, and that intangible rewards may suffice to compensate researchers, there 
is a pragmatic way for a government to pursue the efficient allocation of human capital to 
the research sector. Intuitively, as long as the extension of research for the purpose of idea 
generation and adoption, serves to increase future growth rates, it is socially efficient to 
channel further subsidies into this sector to compensate researchers for these externalities. 
This insight sets the course for future research. Empirical surveys need to investigate what 
is the optimal level of research activities - given a certain size of the human capital stock 
– in order to maximize economic growth.  
It is very important to note that a rather low level of research activities might be 
required to generate economic growth, if a country is a technological follower. The 
example of Japan illustrates how an economy may achieve a high level of national income 
simply by adopting technologies from abroad and converging to the technological 
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frontier. This strategy may not require as extensive research activities as generating 
innovations from scratch. Hence, for a follower country, the optimal allocation of human 
capital may imply a smaller share of human capital in the research sector than in the case 
of a technological leader. This point may actually constitute a disincentive for those 
countries to support the research sector. The internal growth effects of an innovation are 
reflected in the patent price. Innovating firms within the technologically leading country 
may internalize them. But the external knowledge spillovers benefit the research sectors 
in follower countries. Hence, after all, what can be termed externality is in fact external to 
the economy, because knowledge is an international public good. The general free-rider 
problem applies and provides a disincentive for the national governmentto invest in 
research. Hence, a common international subsidization strategy would be most 
appropriate to deal with knowledge spillovers. 
6. Conclusions and research agenda 
The main purpose of this article was to make a step towards more unanimity on the 
issue of what is commonly called education externalities. When everyone is on the same 
page - that was the initial idea - it might be easier to find a generally accepted 
subsidization strategy for a government to pursue. The findings of this article can be 
summarized as follows. 
Much of the confusion arises from the commingling of different concepts, such as 
teaching, education, human capital, and knowledge. Straightening them out makes it 
easier to get to the point of what mechanism actually gives rise to the frequently cited 
externalities, respectively what activity generates them. In terms of primary and 
secondary schooling, the pure consumption of teaching services may exhibit those 
externalities. Hence, there is little doubt that full public financing at those levels is 
justified. For the reason of a stable and mature society it is usually advocated that the state 
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provide every individual the opportunity to get educated. Participating in primary and 
secondary teaching is a not merely a right, but even a duty for individuals. This strategy is 
applicable to any economy. As regards tertiary education, the pure investment in teaching 
services does clearly not yield positive externalities. Rather they are thought to stem from 
the contribution of educated individuals to economic growth. Two types of effects have 
been distinguished; level effects according to Lucas (1988) and growth effects according 
to Romer (1990). Nevertheless skepticism is advisable.  
The Lucasian (1988) level effects are likely to be internalized on the labor market. 
Contrary to what is commonly assumed, education is a private good and nothing suggests 
that property rights are not fully owned and exploitable by individuals. Empirical attempts 
to assess the magnitude of potential Lucasian externalities typically make use of the 
estimated private and social rates of return to education. This, however, has been shown 
to be unsuitable to testify growth externalities pertaining to level shifts. A way to cure the 
deficiencies and a suggestion for future research is to focus on longitudinal surveys for 
specific countries. The macro effect of an additional year of schooling should be 
estimated via time series analysis. The micro-effect of an additional year of schooling on 
individual wage should be estimated cross-sectionally at various points in time. If the 
average of those cross-sectional estimates resembles the coefficient from the time-series 
macro regression, the existence of externalities is unlikely. This outcome seems quite 
likely, given that there is no a priori rationale to worry about individuals not being able to 
exert their educational property rights. Further, the recognition that in the US - where 
public subsidies are relatively low, the demand for teaching services is relatively high – 
suggests that public tertiary teaching subsidies merely serve to crowd out private 
investment. All together, the optimal amount of human capital needed for the operation of 
state-of-the-art technology in the production sector can be expected to be naturally 
provided. 
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The potential internalization of growth effects caused by tertiary education 
according to Romer (1990) has in turn not yet been at the center of empirical studies. 
They arise from the use of human capital in research activities. Ignoring intangible 
externalities and rewards and possibility of internalization via political bargaining, it is 
likely that these effects cannot be fully internalized. In practice, however, it has been 
ignored for a long time that those externalities stem from idea generation, and not from 
the production of education or even the pure consumption of teaching services. More 
specifically, given a certain human capital stock, there is an optimal allocation of human 
capital to the research sector. This recognition sets the course for future investigations. 
Cross-country surveys should explore the empirical link between the scope of research 
activities and economic growth rates. The resulting relationship determines the strategy 
for public subsidization policy. Countries with a rather low level of knowledge generation 
activities may choose to extend subsidies in order to attract the optimal amount of human 
capital to the research sector. The public support of tertiary teaching services, however, 
seems to be a very questionable instrument.10 And in fact, some countries have recently 
introduced a private contribution to higher education finance. Nevertheless, it is still a 
long way to overcome the long tradition of full public financing in many countries. 
Especially the imperfection of credit markets poses a major challenge in this context. 
At end of this article one may wonder, whether externalities are in fact the only 
important determinant of public spending on teaching services. For instance, there are still 
substantial differences in primary and secondary public spending per student; even across 
countries where every student has the chance to attend a publicly financed primary and 
some secondary school. And this is in spite of unanimity regarding externalities. Of 
course, it may partly have to be attributed to differing levels of national income and the 
total scope of government spending as a share of GDP. Nevertheless, other factors might 
contribute to those discrepancies. For instance, Italy and Germany or Switzerland and 
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Ireland are comparable in terms of GDP per capita. So wealth cannot be responsible for 
the vast differences in annual expenditure on educational institutions per student between 
those pairs of countries (see OECD, 2006). Hence, an additional line of research should 
focus on the empirical determinants of public subsidies. This question is even more 
thronging as money does not necessarily improve the quality of education (Hanushek, 
1989). It could be suspected that political factors play a role. The nature of the political 
system, the characteristics of political decision making processes across countries, as well 
as the ideologies of political leaders may be of importance. Last, but not least, it may just 
be historical decisions, which force an economy on a path that leads to the establishment 
of a certain educational policy. These early decisions may not be easily challenged even 
after hundreds of years. Questioning a policy with a long tradition always provokes 
resistance. To examine these influences it is essential to build a history of educational 
spending for a diverse set of countries and combine quantitative analyses with case 
studies that take into account the specific institutional settings of countries. This endeavor 
has been started by Baqir (2002), Lindert (2004) and Stasavage (2005). 
Notes 
 
1. The term "education" is used in the introduction for what should more correctly be called "teaching". 
It will be argued in section 2 that the commingling of those two concepts is responsible for some lack 
of clarity regarding the existence of what is commonly called education externalities. 
2. Carrying it to the extreme, the student's brain mass may be the raw material transformed in the 
process. 
3. The data and more information are accessible at http://www.pisa.oecd.org.  
4. The term "age-heaping" refers to the tendency of people to round their ages to even numbers or 
multiples of five. This phenomenon is more pronounced in less developed regions. A'Hearn, Baten 
and Crayen (2006) argue that it reflects the ability of people to deal with numbers. Of course, it 
should be noted that institutional factors may play an important role in determining the necessity to 
know ones age. 
5. Calling the latter an external effect, however, may be misleading. It will be argued later that it is hard 
to imagine why productivity enhancing effects of human capital would not be recognized by the 
employer and taken into consideration in wage bargaining. 
6. Even when property right protection exists, the gains from an idea or innovation may accrue with the 
buyer of the research activity, unless an inventor is self-employed. That is, because he or she may not 
forward the full gain to the idea generator. This, however, is irrelevant in terms of externalities. The 
sharing of profits from an innovation between a private employer and a private employee is subject to 
their relative bargaining power. Again, there is no reason to think that an employee might not be able 
to exert his property right. The employer must compensate researchers appropriately to give them an 
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incentive to engage in this type of activity. Non-monetary effects associated with it, such as 
recognition and self-realization, may admittedly contribute to keeping salaries lower than expected 
given the actual monetary value of innovations. Nevertheless, from an externality point of view, the 
relevant issue is that too few research activities might be initiated by employers, because firms do not 
take into account potential knowledge spillovers. 
7. This is of course neglecting the important role of institutions. 
8. Of course, due to the long duration of the production process, which takes up to 20 years considering 
all types of education, there may be pig-cycle-like fluctuations around the optimal level of human 
capital. 
9. Also see Pritchett (2001) for a sceptical view on the social return to education. 
10. Barnett and Yandle (2005) even doubt in general that the concept of externalities is helpful to justify 
fiscal policy. They attribute modern interest in externalities mainly to the facts that their nature and 
theory has been widely misunderstood and that externalities can provide a convenient rationale to 
justify fiscal intervention (p.6). 
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Figure 1. Public education expenditures as a share of GDP in OECD countries. 
Source: OECD (2006).
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Figure 2. Public education expenditures as a share in total educational spending in OECD 
countries. 
Source: OECD (2006). 
 
